Abstract. In the practice of block cipher design, designers usually choose linear functions over () n GF 2 with large branch numbers to achieve provable security against differential and linear attack. Recently, the Internet-of-Things gives rise to a number of applications that require Lightweight block ciphers, some new extensions of the diffusion layer were proposed, and these diffusion layers are designed by the matrices over commutative rings. Compared with the matrices which were defined over () n GF 2 , these matrices need less cost in hardware implementation and are thus more suitable for lightweight ciphers. In this work, we prove that the SPN structure with an extended diffusion layer provides a provable security against differential attack and linear attack. The probability of each differential of the SPS function is bounded by r p 1 , where p is the maximum differential probability of S-boxes used in the substitution layer, and r denotes the branch number of the diffusion layer. Similarly, the results of maximum linear hull bias could also be obtained. With the application of our method, we give the first security evaluation for some SPS structures with the matrix over () GF 2 against differential attack.
Introduction
The Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) is a basic design of block cipher, which is highly parallelizable and could process the whole data block within one single round function. Compared with the Feistel-family and other structures, this structure provides faster diffusion and confusion. Since its design, it was adopted by massive famous block ciphers such as AES [1] , ARIA [2] , 3D [3] etc.
The core problem in designing the SPN structure is to design its diffusion layer. For decades, the most attractive diffusion layers are those having matrix representations over () n GF 2 , where n is usually consistent to the bit length of S-box used in the confusion layer. Many block ciphers [1, 2, 3, 4] , especially AES, use this design strategy to construct their diffusion layers. In FSE 2012, Sajadieh et.al [5] extended this design strategy, and the diffusion matrix from this strategy can be treated as an mn mn  matrix over () n GF 2 or an mm  matrix composed of linear transformations over n F 2 . This kind of diffusion layer has already been used in the block cipher SMS4 [6] and the hash function SHA-2 [7] . In SAC2012, Wu et. al. [8] provided an impressive work in constructing a special kind of such diffusion layers in a recursive way, and these matrices often require smaller hardware implementations. Since the multiplication operations with elements in () n GF 2 are specific linear transformations of vector space n F 2 , this new design strategy can be treated as a generalization of the old ones, thus may provide more choices in constructing diffusion layers. Especially for the lightweight block ciphers and hash functions [9] .
Our motivation is, in SPN cipher, if we replace the diffusion layer by a more generalized one [10, 11] , how will it affect the security level of our block ciphers?
Related Work
Among all ways of attacks on block ciphers, the most famous ones are differential attack (DA) [12, 13] and linear attack (LA) [14, 15] . Thus it is a basic requisite for the designer to evaluate the security of any new proposed cipher against these two attacks, and to prove that it is sufficiently resistant against them. In DA, one uses characteristic to describe the behavior of input and output differences for some number of consecutive rounds. However, it may not be necessary to fix the values of input and output differences for the intermediate rounds in a characteristic, so naturally the notion of differential was introduced [16] . The same statements can be applied to LA [17] . Named by Nyberg and Knudsen, a block cipher is said to have provable security against DA and LA, if the upper bounds of the maximum average of differential and linear hull probabilities are sufficiently small [18] . S. Hong et. al. studied the provable security of SPN structure whose diffusion layer is chosen as the maximal or semi-maximal matrices over () n GF 2 [19] , and later, Kang et. al. made an extension, they worked on the diffusion layers matrices over () n GF 2 , and removed the branch number limits on matrices [20] .
Our Contribution
Inspirited by Hongs and Kang's work [19, 20] , in this paper we consider the provable security measure of generalized SPN, namely, the diffusion layer is chosen as an mm  matrix composed of linear transformations over n F 2 , while most of the previous results are based on the matrices over ( . Similarly, if the maximum liner hull probability of S-boxes is denoted by q and the linear branch number of the diffusion layer is denoted by r , then the linear hull bias of SPS is bounded by r q 1 . Applying our results on traditional SPS structures (means the entries in the diffusion layer are selected from () n GF 2 ), we may get the same results as in [11] , what's more, our results are compatible with Crypton [22] and other generalized SPS structures whose diffusion matrix are defined over () GF 2 ).
Organization
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some notations and definitions. Section 3 works on the properties of the generalized diffusion layers, Section 4 provides a provable security for the generalized SPN structure against DA and LA. Section 5 applies our results on some well-known SPS structures. Final Section 6 draws the conclusion.
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Preliminaries
In this paper, we use the following symbols: is a linear bijection, and one round SPN structure is defined as
SPN is a basic structure of modern ciphers, and many ciphers employ this structure in their round functions. In two rounds SPN, since the last P layer does not affect the security, we omit this layer in this paper, i.e. in this paper, we only focus on the SPS structure.
In SPN cipher, the most popular design of the diffusion layer is based on the mm  matrix over the field () n GF 2 , such sound examples are AES [1] , ARIA [2] , LED [21] and Gimli [23] , employ this kind of diffusion layers, in which the inputs are transformed through several constant multipliers and then to the outputs word-wise. The constant multipliers of () n GF 2 could be treated as special form linear transformations over { , } n 01 . Thus these matrices can be treated as mn mn
instead of those with entries selected from () n GF 2 . In [5] , Sajadieh et.al extended this design strategy, they proposed an mm  matrix composed of linear transformations over n F 2 , using basic linear algebraic theory, this kind of matrices could also be treated as mn mn
According to the different design strategies, the diffusion layer P can be classified into two kinds: the matrices can be seen as the matrix over a finite field ( [16, 17] . Let f be a mapping defined over { , } n 01 , then for any given , , , { , } n x y x y      01 , the differential probability and the linear bias are defined as follows , people often use p ,  and the branch number to describe the resistances of an SPS function against the traditional differential attack and the linear attack by bounding the probability of the characteristics.
be a matrix over { , } 01 , then the n bundle differential branch number of P is defined as
and the n bundle linear branch number of P is defined as
Properties of the Generalized Diffusion Layer
In this section, we focus on the cryptographic properties of the generalized diffusion layers. Since the left matrix in the equation above is invertible, thus we end the proof.
Theorem 2 tells that even though the entries of the matrix are chosen from nn  B instead of () n GF 2 , we can still fix any mr  21 bundles of the generalized diffusion layer P and determine the rests uniquely. This property forms the basis of our analysis next.
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Provable Security for Generalized SPN Structure Against DA and LA
With the preparation above, we are arriving at our main theorems. , where p denotes the maximum differential probability of all the S-boxes, and the P layer is defined by an mm  matrix over nn  B .
Proof. We take consideration of the differentials depicted in Fig. 1 . Let ,  be two permutations
1 , without loss of generality, we may assume , which means by fixing In case hr  1 , we have , where  denotes the maximum linear bias of all the S-boxes, and the P layer is defined by an mm  matrix over nn  B .
Application and Comparison
In this section, we apply our results in estimating the differential probabilities of several famous SPS structures (see Table 1 ).
In general, if the SPS structure employs the matrix over a finite field, the results proposed by [20] may suit quite well. However, if we choose generalized diffusion layer, for example, Crypton [22] , SPS 1 [8] and SPS 2 [6] , then the condition of [20] will never be satisfied, thus by their estimation we cannot get any result. With the application of our method, we give the first security evaluation for them against differential attack in Table 1 . 
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Conclusions
Using the matrices over () n GF 2 are sometimes unfitted in resource constrained environments, such as RFID systems and sensor networks, thus people have to employ the matrix over commutative rings to guarantee better implementation performance. As mentioned in [8] , these generalized matrices can be used to gain smaller hardware implementations. In this paper, we studied the upper bounds of the maximum average of differential and linear hull probabilities of generalized SPN ciphers, we proved that the probability of each differential (resp. linear hull) of the SPS function with a r -branch number ). These results give a provable security for the generalized SPN structure against DA and LA. Compared with the results of [19] and [20] , these generalized matrices provide same security level against DA and LA, thus is suitable to be used in the SPN structure.
